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Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) are memories of past events that 
come to mind without deliberate retrieval attempts. Common in everyday life, IAMs 
have recently become a topic of experimental investigations with laboratory procedures. 
In the present study, we build on the recent methodological advancement in the study of 
IAMs and we investigate the effects of manipulating the attentional load on the incidence 
of IAMs, as well as on the level of meta-awareness of these memories. In two 
experiments, attentional load was manipulated by varying the demands of the focal 
vigilance task and reports of IAMs were collected. In Experiment 1, participants were 
instructed to stop the vigilance task whenever mental contents unrelated to the task came 
to their minds (self-caught method). In Experiment 2, participants were intermittently 
interrupted and probed regarding the contents of their experience (probe-caught method) 
and the level of meta-awareness for these contents. In both experiments we found a 
reduction in the frequency of IAMs under increased attentional load. Moreover, in 
Experiment 2, IAMs were characterized by varied levels of meta-awareness, which was 
reduced by increased attentional load. These results suggest that attentional resources are 
necessary both for retrieving IAMs and for meta-awareness of these memories. 
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For a long time, research on autobiographical memory has been mainly focused on 
the investigation of deliberately retrieved memories of personal events, intentionally 
generated in response to specific cues provided by the experimenter (for a review see 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). However, in many situations in our daily lives we 
find ourselves being engaged in memories of personal events that come to mind with no 
conscious or deliberate attempt directed at their retrieval (Berntsen, 1996, 2010; Mace, 
2007). During the last two decades, there has been a surge of interest in both 
psychology and neuroscience toward the investigation of involuntary autobiographical 
memories (IAMs) (see, for a review, Berntsen, 2010).  
Up until recently, the most common approach for studying IAMs has been the 
naturalistic diary method, in which individuals are asked to keep a diary of the IAMs 
they experience in everyday life (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Mace, 
2004). The studies using the diary method established two major features of IAMs as 
experienced outside laboratory. First, the majority of IAMs are elicited by identifiable 
external cues, generally related to prominent aspects of the remembered experiences 
(cue-memory match, e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004). Second, IAMs are 
more likely to occur during undemanding activities that require little attention or 
concentration.  
Over the last years, the study of IAMs has been extended to laboratory settings. 
Building on the first regularity of IAMs – their cue-dependent nature – a number of 
experimental procedures have been developed that aim specifically at eliciting IAMs 
(e.g., Ball, 2007; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti, & 
Mazzoni, 2014). These procedures, by gaining control over triggers for IAMs, allowed 
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for a detailed examination of the question concerning the properties of the cues that are 
effective in eliciting IAMs. For example, in the study by Schlagman & Kvavilashvili 
(2008), participants were asked to perform a vigilance task while being simultaneously 
exposed to task-irrelevant cue-phrases. Participants were instructed to stop the 
procedure whenever they experience an IAM, to record basic details about the memory 
(i.e., memory description, triggers, concentration rating) and then resume the vigilance 
task. In the study, the majority of IAMs reported during the task were triggered by the 
word-cues on the screen, with cues of negative emotional valence being more effective 
in eliciting IAMs compared to positive and neutral cues. Using a modified version of 
this experimental paradigm, Mazzoni, Vannucci, and Batool (2014) directly compared 
the effectiveness of verbal and pictorial cues in eliciting IAMs and showed that more 
IAMs were elicited when verbal cues were presented during a vigilance task. In a 
related vein, Berntsen, Staugaard, and Sørensen (2013) showed that only cues that 
uniquely pointed to a single memory, at the exclusion of other memory records, were 
capable to produce cue-memory matches strong enough to elicit IAMs (see also Rubin, 
1995). 
While the issue of cue-dependence of IAMs received much empirical scrutiny, the 
second regularity concerning IAMs derived from the diary studies – their 
preponderance in states of diffused rather than concentrated attention – remains 
understudied.  
The results of diary studies suggest that the frequency of IAMs depends on the 
attentional demands of the ongoing task, but the intrinsic limitations of such studies, the 
inability to manipulate variables being the most obvious pitfall, prevent the possibility 
of identifying the exact mechanism(s) by which attentional load influences the 
occurrence of IAMs. To our knowledge, the role of attention in the elicitation of IAMs 
          Attentional load and involuntary memories 
 
5 
has been experimentally investigated only in a single study (Ball, 2007). Ball had 
participants produce free associations to word cues (concrete nouns). At the end of the 
trial, participants were asked to report if a personal experience had come to their minds 
while they were giving the free-association responses. Importantly, while providing 
free associations, half of the participants (control condition) observed an unchanging 
box in the middle of the computer screen, whereas the other half (dual-task condition) 
were asked to perform a secondary task of pressing a button in response to a color-
changing box. The comparison between the two conditions revealed a negative effect of 
the higher attentional load: more associations preceded the IAM in the dual-task 
condition than in the control condition, suggesting that when attention load is low, 
memory cuing can lead to wider and faster spreading of activation throughout the 
memory networks, and thus to facilitated retrieval of IAMs.  
The results obtained by Ball (2007) converge with the results of diary studies in 
suggesting the role of attentional load in triggering IAMs. However, the specific 
mechanism by which this modulation occurs remains unclear. Specifically, we argue 
that the reduction in the rate of IAMs under high level of attentional load might arise 
for two reasons. Attention-demanding activities might hamper the involuntary retrieval 
of autobiographical memories because attention allocated to a demanding focal task is 
removed from retrieval-related processes such as accessing and developing a memory 
(Baddeley, 1993) and/or inhibiting the memories competing for retrieval access (see 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Mandler, 1994). Apart from this retrieval effect, a post-
retrieval effect of increased attentional load also seems possible. Specifically, attention-
demanding activities might impact upon higher monitoring processes such as meta-
awareness – people’s ability to become aware of the contents of their own minds. 
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In the context of research on autobiographical memory, a recent study by Vannucci 
et al. (2014) found that people do not always notice that they have had an IAM during a 
vigilance task and they might then omit reporting them on numerous occasions. 
However, if stopped during the task, they might become aware of having 
memories/thoughts at the moment or seconds earlier. Recent studies on trauma-related 
intrusions reported that people often failed to recognize the occurrence of intrusive 
thoughts, suggesting that people may lack meta-awareness of their trauma-related 
thoughts (Takarangi, Lindsay, & Strange, 2015; Takarangi, Nayda, Strange, & Nixon, 
2017; Takarangi, Strange, & Lindsay, 2014). In a related vein, studies of the 
phenomenon of mind wandering have shown that individuals routinely fail (at least 
temporarily) to notice that their minds have started wandering, as people are only 
intermittently aware of their current focus of attention (Smallwood, McSpadden, & 
Schooler, 2008).  
Overall, all these findings lead to a hypothesis whereby attentional load may impact upon 
the incidence of IAMs not by, or rather not solely by, affecting memory retrieval but also by 
impacting upon post-retrieval processes associated with meta-awareness of cognitive states. 
The aim of the present study is thus to examine the role of attentional load in the involuntary 
retrieval of autobiographical memories, and specifically to assess separately the effects on 
both retrieval and post-retrieval (meta-awareness) processes involved in reporting IAMs. In 
two experiments, we manipulated attentional load associated with the focal task in a between-
subjects design, with high attentional load being experienced by one group (High-AL), and 
low attentional load by the other (Low-AL). To assess IAMs, we employed a modified 
version of the vigilance task with irrelevant cue-words developed by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008), already used in previous studies of IAMs (Barzykowski & 
Niedźwieńska, 2016; Mazzoni et al., 2014; Vannucci et al., 2014; Vannucci, Pelagatti, 
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Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, & Rossi Paccani, 2015). In Experiment 1, IAMs were assessed 
using the self-caught method, by which participants were instructed to stop the vigilance task 
whenever mental contents unrelated to the task came to their minds. The reported contents 
were further analyzed to extract instances of IAMs. In Experiment 2, we applied the same 
experimental manipulation as in Experiment 1, but we assessed IAMs with the probe-caught 
method, by which participants were intermittently and pseudo-randomly interrupted and 
probed regarding the contents of their experience. By using the probe-caught method, the role 
of monitoring in reporting IAMs should be minimized, allowing for a clearer examination of 
the retrieval dynamics. Moreover, the probes used in Experiment 2 were also accompanied by 
a meta-awareness rating, asking how aware participants were of where their attention was 
focused immediately prior to the probe. In this way, we were able to assess the level of meta-
awareness associated with retrieved IAMs in different attentional load conditions. In both 
experiments phenomenological properties of IAMs, as specificity, vividness, pleasantness, 
and intensity of the feeling experienced during the retrieval, were also assessed and analyzed 
for exploratory purposes.  
 
3. Experiment 1 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Design 
The experiments in this study conformed to a between-subjects design comparing 
the effect of attentional load (low vs. high) on the number of IAMs and their 
phenomenological properties. For those IAMs that were reported by participants as being 
triggered by cues presented on the screen retrieval times were also collected and 
analysed. 
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As no previous research had addressed a similar issue, we had no a priori 
information to determine an expected effect size. Hence, for both experiments we 
decided to collect a number of participants that could allow us to detect significant 
differences with a large effect size. Given that we planned to mainly perform 
independent samples t-tests, we computed through G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) that, in order to detect significant differences with a large effect 
size (d  0.80) with a significance level (two-tailed) of .05, a statistical power of .80, and 
the same number of participants in each group, a minimum total sample size of 52 
participants could be considered adequate. Since some participants could decide to drop 
out from the experiment at any time and/or problems with the data collection devices 
could lead to missing or invalid data, some more participants were recruited.  
3.1.2. Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students from the University of Florence (42 females, 
mean age = 21 years, SD = 2.6 years; age range: 18-35 years) were randomly assigned to 
one of the two conditions, High-AL (n = 32) and Low-AL (n = 32). They were all native 
Italian speakers, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Groups did not significantly 
differ in age and sex ratio.  
3.1.3. Materials 
Vigilance task. During the experimental session, participants completed a modified 
version of the vigilance task developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and used 
in previous studies to investigate IAMs (Mazzoni et al., 2014; Vannucci et al., 2014, 
2015; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, & Mazzoni, 2016). The task consisted of 510 trials of 
target detection, presented in a pseudo-random order (see below), each remaining on the 
screen for 1.5 sec. In the Low-AL condition, on each trial, an image was shown on the 
computer screen depicting either a pattern of black horizontal and black vertical lines (non-
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target stimuli) or a pattern of black horizontal and red vertical lines (target stimuli). In the 
High-AL condition, non-target stimuli consisted of a pattern of red horizontal and black 
vertical lines, whereas the target consisted of a pattern of black horizontal and red 
vertical lines (as in the Low-AL condition) (Figure 1). 
In both groups, the target stimuli appeared on 10 trials and they were presented 
pseudo-randomly, that is, every 40-60 trials, in order to ensure that they occurred at long 
and irregular intervals (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; Vannucci et al., 2014, 2015). 
Word-phrases that were to serve as cues for IAMs (e.g., “washing hands”, “favourite 
food”, “falling down stairs”) were placed in the middle of the image, presented in 18-CPI 
Arial font, and displayed without obscuring any of the lines. These were included on 102 
trials (1/5 of the total number of trials). The word-phrases were selected from the Italian 
adaptation of a standardized pool of 800 word-phrases developed by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008) and already used in previous studies on IAMs (for more details on 
the adaptation, see Vannucci et al., 2015). Equal numbers of neutral (n = 34), positive (n 
= 34), and negative (n = 34) cues were presented during the task.  
Memory characteristics questionnaire. Participants recorded details of their 
memories on a modified version of a questionnaire used in previous studies on IAMs 
(Vannucci et al., 2015). We asked participants to rate the vividness of the memory (from 1 = 
'very vague, almost no image at all', to 5 = 'very vivid, almost like normal vision'), its 
pleasantness (1 = 'very unpleasant'; 3 = 'neutral'; 5 = 'very pleasant'), and the intensity of 
the feeling experienced at retrieval (1 = 'none'; 5 = 'a lot'). We also asked participants to 
specify whether the remembered event was general or specific. Participants received 
instructions on how to identify a general and a specific memory (for more details, see 
Vannucci et al., 2016). At the end of the experiment, participants also rated their overall 
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level of concentration (1 ='not at all concentrated'; 5 = 'fully concentrated') and the level 
of boredom experienced during the task (1 = 'not at all'; 5 = 'very bored').  
3.1.4. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. After completing the informed consent form, 
participants were told that they would take part in a study examining concentration using 
a vigilance task and they were instructed to detect target stimuli (images with red vertical 
lines and black horizontal lines) among a large number of non-target stimuli by saying 
"yes" out loud each time they detected a target stimulus. They were told that they would 
also see short word-phrases in some of the trials, but they were not supposed to do 
anything with these items. It was explained that the condition they were taking part in 
was looking at how people could keep their concentration on the patterns (line detection 
group) and that in another condition (word detection group) participants would have to 
concentrate on the words (this was a cover story, the word-detection group did not exist). 
Participants were further instructed that, due to the task being quite monotonous, they 
could find themselves thinking about other things, which was quite normal. They were 
told that if any task-unrelated mental content (mental contents could refer to thoughts, 
intentions, plans for the future, past experiences, etc.) crossed their mind during the task, 
they should click the mouse to interrupt the presentation and write a short sentence 
describing their mental content. They were informed that this initial brief description of 
the mental content should be sufficient to remind them of that specific mental content at 
a later point in time. They were also asked to indicate whether the mental content was 
triggered by something (internal thoughts, an element in the environment, or a word-
phrase on the screen) or whether there was no trigger. If the mental content was triggered 
by a word-phrase shown on the screen, they were asked to specify which one. The actual 
task was preceded by a short 15 trials practice phase (training). At the end of the 
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vigilance task, after all stimuli had been presented and all contents recorded, participants 
were informed about the nature of involuntary memories and they were presented with 
the descriptions of their mental contents one by one and asked to indicate the involuntary 
memories. For each of the involuntary memories they were asked to complete a brief 
questionnaire assessing phenomenological properties of memories (see Materials). The 
session lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes. 
3.2. Results 
We first assessed whether the manipulation of attentional load was effective in 
varying the demands of the vigilance task by examining the rate of errors in detection of 
the target perceptual patterns. Indeed, the High-AL and Low-AL groups differed in this 
respect, (2 (1, n = 64) = 5.38, p = .020, r = .29), with the participants in the High-AL 
being more likely to make at least one error (94%) compared to the Low-AL group 
(72%). We decided to dichotomize the number of errors since 53 (82.8%) participants 
did not make any error, 6 (9.4%) made 1, 4 (6.3%) made 2, and 1 (1.6%) made 3.  
No significant differences between the two groups were found in the self-reported 
level of boredom (High-AL: M = 3.00, SD = 0.84; Low-AL: M = 3.03, SD = 1.09; t(62) = 
-0.13, p = .898, d = 0.03) and concentration (High-AL: M = 3.59, SD = 0.56; Low-AL: M 
= 3.41, SD = 0.80; t(62) = 1.09, p = .281, d = 0.26) experienced during the task.  
During the vigilance task participants were asked to report all task-unrelated mental 
contents that came into their mind. At the end of the task, participants performed the 
classification of mental contents as memories or not. Before conducting the data 
analyses, all mental contents classified as involuntary memories were read through by 
the experimenter to check that they were autobiographical in nature (semantic “mind-
pops” were excluded). 
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Participants generated a total of 219 IAMs with a mean of 3.42 (SD = 2.38, range = 
0-9) per participant. The majority of reported IAMs (96.35%) had an identifiable trigger. 
Of these, 82.94 % were reported to be triggered by the cues on the screen, 16.11% by 
internal thoughts, and 0.95% by other environmental cues. The comparison of the total 
number of IAMs between the two groups revealed that the Low-AL group reported more 
than twice the number of IAMs reported by the High-AL group (Low-AL: M = 4.81, SD 
= 2.07; High-AL: M = 2.03, SD = 1.79; t(62) = 5.75, p < .001, d = 1.44). A similar 
pattern was obtained when the analyses were limited to the subset of IAMs reported as 
being triggered by the specific cues on the screen: Low-AL reported a higher number of 
IAMs triggered by the cues compared to High-AL (Low-AL: M = 3.81, SD = 1.93; High-
AL: M = 1.66, SD = 1.72; t(62) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 1.18). 
We also compared in the two groups the mean proportion of memories that were 
reported to have a trigger. Triggers could be a cue, a thought or an environmental 
stimulus. Because environmental cues were reported as triggers of a memory in only two 
cases they were not further analysed. t-tests for independent samples revealed no 
significant differences between High-AL and Low-AL in the mean proportion of IAMs 
triggered by the cues (High-AL: M = 0.75, SD = 0.34; Low-AL: M = 0.78, SD = 0.25; 
t(55) = 0.34, p = .733, d = 0.10) or by thoughts (High-AL: M = 0.22, SD = 0.34; Low-
AL: M = 0.17, SD = 0.23; t(55) = -0.67, p = .504, d = 0.18). 
Next, we assessed whether the experimental manipulation affected the 
phenomenological qualities of IAMs. In this case the phenomenological qualities were 
rated for each reported IAM, and could vary not only between participants, but also 
within participants. Hence, we had to consider as a unit of analysis a single memory. 
Given that participants could report more than one IAM, we used a multilevel (or 
hierarchical) dataset, in which IAMs were nested into participants. The use of this 
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strategy of analysis not only allowed us to take into account the non-independence of the 
units of analysis, but also to accommodate for unequal numbers of data points within 
participants (Jahng, Wood, & Trull, 2008). We thus specified random-intercept 
multilevel models to test for associations of the group factor (Low-AL vs. High-AL) with 
the ratings of phenomenological qualities of the IAMs, which were considered as the 
dependent variables. No significant differences between the two groups were found in 
any phenomenological qualities of IAMs (see Table 1), nor in their specificity (Odds 
ratio with "Low" as reference: 0.88, confidence interval [CI]: 0.43-1.74, p = .746) 
For those IAMs that participants reported as being triggered by word-phrases shown 
on the screen, retrieval times (RTs, as in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) were 
calculated. RTs were calculated by adding the RT for the present (clicked on) trial, to the 
RTs for all the trials back, up to the trial that presented the word that was reported by the 
participant as the trigger of the mental content. Similarly to the analyses on the 
phenomenological qualities of the IAMs, we specified random-intercept multilevel 
models. Given that RTs in this experiment were substantially skewed (4.53) and kurtotic 
(29.77), we conducted the analysis of retrieval times of IAMs after log-transformation of 
RTs. The analysis revealed an effect of the Group (F(1, 59.30) = 5.59, p = .021), where 
RTs were slower in the High-AL group (estimated M = 3.84, 95% CI: 3.73-3.94) 
compared to the Low-AL group (estimated M = 3.68, 95% CI: 3.61-3.76)  
 
4. Experiment 2 
The reduction in the rate of IAMs found in Experiment 1 might arise for two 
reasons: attention-demanding activities may have interfered with the retrieval processes 
and/or they might have reduced the ability to monitor one’s mind in order to notice and 
report IAMs. To distinguish between these two effects, in Experiment 2 we assessed 
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Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Florence (47 females, mean age 
= 21.35 years, SD = 1.87 years; age range: ) were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions, High-AL (n = 30) and Low-AL (n = 30). All participants were native Italian 
speakers, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
4.1.3. Materials 
Vigilance task. The vigilance task and the experimental manipulation of focused 
attention was the same as in Experiment 1 but the number of trials was extended from 
510 to 800. The target stimuli (black horizontal lines and red vertical lines) appeared on 
16 trials and the word-phrases on 160 trials (54 were neutral, 53 positive and 53 
negative). At 15 fixed points during the presentation, the vigilance task was stopped and 
two questions (a probe trial) appeared on the screen. The first question was “What were 
you thinking about just immediately prior to the probe?” with response options “I was 
focused on the task”, “I was thinking about” (and write down a short sentence describing 
their mental content and the trigger, if any) and “My mind was blank”. The second 
question was “How aware were you of where your attention was focused?” Participants 
indicated their level of awareness by using a 7-point scale (1 = fully aware; 7 = fully 
unaware). The first probe was at trial 35 and there were a minimum of 35 and a 
maximum of 72 trials between each probe trial. 
Memory characteristics questionnaire. Participants were asked to fill out the same 
memory questionnaire used in Experiment 1. 
4.1.4. Procedure 
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Participants were tested individually in the same way as in Experiment 1. They 
received the same training phase and the same tasks upon the completion of the main 
vigilance sections of the experiments. The instructions were modified to inform 
participants that they would be interrupted during the performance and presented with 
thought probes consisting of two questions. 
 
4.2. Results 
Due to a technical error, the data of two participants (one in the High-AL group) 
were not recorded. The High-AL group was more likely (93%) to commit at least one 
error in the vigilance task than the Low-AL group (72%) (2 (1, n = 58) = 4.35, p = .040, 
r = .27), confirming that our manipulation served to vary the demands of the focal task. 
We again decided to dichotomize the number of errors since 48 (82.8%) participants did 
not make any error, 7 (12.1%) made 1, 1 (1.7%) made 2, 1 (1.7%) made 4, and 1 (1.7%) 
made 6. 
No significant differences between the two groups were found in the self-reported 
level of boredom (High-AL: M = 3.03, SD = 0.91; Low-AL: M = 3.07, SD = 0.92; t(56) = 
0.14, p = .886, d = 0.04) and concentration experienced during the task (High-AL: M = 
3.38, SD = 0.68; Low-AL: M = 3.59, SD = 0.87; t(56) = 1.01, p = .315, d = 0.27). 
Participants generated a total of 143 IAMs with a mean of 2.47 (SD = 2.04, range = 
0-9) per participant. The majority of IAMs (95.10%) had an identifiable trigger. Of these, 
77.21% were reported to be triggered by the cues on the screen, 16.91% by internal 
thoughts, and 2.94% by other environmental cues.  
The comparison of the total number of IAMs between the two groups showed that 
Low-AL group reported significantly more IAMs than did the High-AL group (Low-AL: 
M = 3.31, SD = 2.25; High-AL: M = 1.62, SD = 1.37; t(56) = 3.45, p = .001, d = 0.91). A 
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similar pattern was obtained when the analyses were limited to the subset of IAMs 
reported as being triggered by the specific cues on the screen: Low-AL reported a higher 
number of IAMs triggered by the cues compared to High-AL (Low-AL: M = 2.72, SD = 
2.03; High-AL: M = 0.93, SD = 1.05; t(55) = 4.17, p < .001, d = 1.10). These results 
replicate the main results of Experiment 1, but this time with a probe-catching rather than 
self-catching method. 
We also compared in the two groups the mean proportion of memories that were 
reported to have a trigger. Triggers could be a cue, a thought, or an environmental 
stimulus. Environmental cues as triggers of a memory were reported in only two cases 
and were not further analysed. t-tests for independent samples revealed that the High-AL 
reported a lower proportion of IAMs triggered by the cues compared to Low-AL (High-
AL: M = 0.55, SD = 0.43; Low-AL: M = 0.84, SD = 0.25; t(51) = 3.12, p = .003, d = 
0.85), but no significant difference was found in the mean proportion of IAMs triggered 
by thoughts (High-AL: M = 0.16, SD = 0.29; Low-AL: M = 0.09, SD = 0.16; t(47) = -
1.23, p = .225, d = 0.36).  
Next, we assessed whether the experimental manipulation affected the level of 
awareness associated with the retrieval of IAMs. As in Experiment 1, we allowed a 
multilevel structure to the data, since the level of awareness of an IAM could vary both 
between and within participants. Again, the unit of analysis was the single IAM. Low-
AL participants reported a higher level of awareness (lower rating) compared to High-
AL (Low-AL: estimated M = 2.63 (95% CI: 2.08-3.18); High-AL: estimated M = 3.63 
(95% CI: 2.97-4.28); F(1, 49.40) = 5.47, p = .023). Thus, increased attentional load not 
only reduced the number of IAMs caught by the probes, as seen in the earlier analysis, 
but it also reduced awareness of the remaining IAMs that were eventually caught by the 
probes. These results point to a double-whammy effect of attentional load on IAMs, with 
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the effects located both at the stage of memory retrieval and at the stage of conscious 
experience of retrieved memories. No significant differences between the two groups 
were found in any phenomenological qualities of IAMs (see Table 2), nor in their 
specificity (Odds ratio with "Low" as reference: 0.92, CI: 0.29-2.95, p = .885). 
 
5. General Discussion  
The present study looked at the incidence of IAMs elicited in a laboratory procedure 
as a function of attentional load of the primary task during which IAMs were collected. 
Overall, increased attentional load was associated with the reduced number of IAMs, as 
assessed with both self-caught (Experiment 1) and probe-caught method (Experiment 2). 
These results indicate that attentional load posed by the focal task in which one is 
engaged is a major factor determining whether spontaneous and unrelated memories of 
one’s past are likely to occur. The fact that this reduction was observed with the probe-
caught method – a procedure specifically designed to circumvent the post-retrieval 
monitoring processes – indicates that one mechanism by which increased attentional load 
reduces the incidence of IAMs is by limiting the basic retrieval processes operating 
within the system of autobiographical memory. However, additional results from 
Experiment 2 indicate also that increased attentional load not only interferes with the 
retrieval of IAMs, but at the same time it reduces the self-reported meta-awareness of the 
spontaneous memories that pass the retrieval threshold. Taken together, these results 
point to a double role of attentional resources in shaping both the retrieval (occurrence of 
IAMs) and post-retrieval processes (meta-awareness of IAMs) related to spontaneously 
arising autobiographical memories. 
By emphasizing the role of attentional load in the occurrence of spontaneous 
autobiographical memories, our findings are in agreement with the results of the diary 
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studies, which showed that IAMs are more likely to be reported when one is engaged in 
undemanding activities that require little attention and concentration (Berntsen & Hall, 
2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). They also join the empirical contribution of Ball 
(2007), who found that IAMs came to mind later during a word-association task if 
attentional load was increased under dual-task conditions. Importantly, in the present 
study, we could clearly demonstrate a causal role of focused attention in controlling 
IAMs by using a direct experimental manipulation targeting attentional load while 
equating experimental conditions in terms of other variables such as the amount of visual 
stimulation and response demands. However, the crucial insight that our use of the 
laboratory procedure enabled was a clear delineation of the double-mechanism account 
by which attentional load operates both at retrieval and post-retrieval levels of cognitive 
processing within the system of autobiographical memory. 
The negative effects of attentional load on the rates of IAMs observed here could 
help to clarify the results of a recent study on IAMs in which the effect of cue frequency 
on the rate of IAMs was observed (Vannucci et al., 2015). In this study, which also used 
the vigilance task employed here, cue frequency was experimentally manipulated, so that 
participants were presented with frequent verbal cues or infrequent verbal cues with the 
remaining trials in the vigilance task either left empty or filled with arithmetic 
operations. It was found that, compared to infrequent cues, both conditions with frequent 
cues and infrequent cues plus arithmetic operations decreased the number of IAMs 
reported (for a similar effect on involuntary musical imagery, see Floridou, Williamson, 
& Stewart, 2016). The present study suggests that this difference in the incidence of 
IAMs arose because increased external stimulation – either in the form of frequent verbal 
cues or arithmetic operations – constituted additional cognitive load that interfered both 
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with retrieval of IAMs and with participants’ subjective insight into the contents of their 
own minds which is necessary for reporting an IAM.  
Apart from informing research on IAMs, the present results are of consequence also 
for investigations of other forms of spontaneous cognition, as, for example, mind 
wandering. Indeed, so far, the lines of research focused on IAMs and mind wandering 
have developed to a large extent independently, with little discussion concerning the 
theoretical links between the two phenomena (but see McVay & Kane, 2013; Plimpton, 
Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015; Vannucci, Pelagatti & Marchetti, 2017). Both IAMs and 
MW are mental contents that are incidental to the focal task and spontaneously generated 
(but see Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016, for a discussion of intentional MW), 
potentially creating a common conceptual framework encompassing both phenomena. 
Indeed, a significant proportion of episodes examined in mind wandering studies have 
been described as concerning personal past and thus could be possibly classified as IAMs 
(Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & D’Argembeau, 2013). 
However, the theoretical considerations of IAMs and mind wandering differ in one 
important aspect. IAMs are clearly cue-dependent (Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 
2004), with a number of studies being devoted specifically to elucidating the nature of 
the cues that are most likely to elicit IAMs. Indeed, the cue-dependent nature of IAMs 
forms the basis of the procedures used to investigate this phenomenon, including the 
procedure used in the present study. By contrast, in the mind wandering literature, mind 
wandering episodes have been mainly described as self-generated (e.g., Smallwood, 
2013) and stimulus-independent (Antrobus, 1968), terms that emphasize their 
independence from perception and ongoing actions. Only very recently, a few studies 
employed a modified version of the vigilance task with irrelevant cues originally 
developed for studying IAMs, to investigate the association between external cues and 
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the frequency and temporal orientation of mind wandering (Plimpton et al., 2015; 
Vannucci et al., 2017). The results of these studies demonstrated that task-irrelevant 
verbal stimulation (i.e. word-phrases) increases the frequency of mind wandering and 
steers its temporal orientation toward the past.  
In fact, previous studies on mind wandering have consistently shown that the frequency 
of mind wandering depends heavily on the cognitive demands of the ongoing task. The rate 
of mind wandering is reduced whenever the focal task is made more difficult, requiring a 
stronger involvement of the attentional processes operating within the working memory 
system (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Teasdale et al., 1995) or focused attention 
(e.g., manipulation of perceptual load, Forster & Lavie, 2009) – that is, when the attentional 
load is increased. Our results on the effects of attentional load on retrieval and post-retrieval 
processes of IAMs, collected within a paradigm designed specifically to assess IAMs clearly 
parallel the observations reported in the mind wandering studies and add to the argument for 
common cognitive principles governing mind wandering and IAMs.  
Apart from exploring the links between mind wandering and IAMs, three other 
future directions present themselves. First, in Experiment 1 we found that for IAMs 
reported as being triggered by word-phrases, retrieval times (RTs) were slower in the 
High-AL group compared to the Low-AL group. These findings suggest that attentional 
load might also interfere with the time needed to generate and/or become aware of an 
IAM. So far, research on IAMs has been focused on the rates of IAMs but these results 
suggest that the temporal dynamics of IAMs should also be explored. Second, in the 
present study we investigated the effects of attentional load on IAMs and their meta-
awareness in a sample of young adults. Future studies might investigate these effects in 
other populations of special interest for research on IAMs, such as elderly people. A few 
studies using diary methods (Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009; 
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Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007) found age-related reduction in IAMs when 
elderly participants reported being more concentrated on the ongoing activities compared 
to younger adults. The decrease in the frequency of IAMs could thus potentially be 
explained, at in least in part, by the age-related reduction in attentional abilities, a 
possibility that awaits further work. Finally, in our study we focused on ordinary, daily-
life IAMs. However, research on spontaneously evoked memories is of importance not 
only for understanding cognition in standard, every-day situations but also for advancing 
investigations into abnormal forms of cognition, such as intrusive memories occurring in 
post-traumatic stress disorder. For this reason, future studies might extend the 
investigation of the role of attentional load in governing spontaneous memories to 
unpleasant and unwanted intrusive memories/images for negative or adverse material. 
Recent studies on trauma-related intrusions reported that people are not always aware of 
them (i.e., people may lack meta-awareness of their trauma-related thoughts) (Takarangi 
et al., 2014, 2015, 2017), suggesting that self-report may underestimate the frequency of 
intrusive thoughts and memories. Future studies are needed to investigate whether and 
how (i.e., retrieval and post-retrieval processes) attentional load might affect the 
frequency of occurrence of this other kind of spontaneous cognition. 
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Fig1. Example of the stimulus displays in High-Attentional Load (High-AL; top) 
and Low-Attentional Load (Low-AL; bottom) group 
 
  




Table 1. Phenomenological qualities of involuntary autobiographical memories in High-
Attentional Load (High-AL) and Low-Attentional Load (Low-AL) groups in Experiments 
1 and 2. 
 
Variable Estimated group means (95% CI) F df p 
Low-AL High-AL 
Experiment 1 
n 32 32    
Vividness 4.20 (4.01-4.38) 4.10 (3.84-4.36) 0.34 1, 60.54 .559 
Pleasantness 3.35 (3.11-3.59) 3.29 (2.94-3.64) 0.07 1, 64.92 .795 
Intensity 3.36 (3.13-3.60) 3.18 (2.85-3.51) 0.80 1, 64.41 .374 
      
Experiment 2 
n 29 29    
Vividness 3.99 (3.69-4.28) 3.92 (3.54-4.31) 0.06 1, 51.13 .793 
Pleasantness 2.95 (2.64-3.25) 3.12 (2.70-3.54) 0.46 1, 44.15 .498 
Intensity 3.30 (2.98-3.62) 3.05 (2.63-3.47) 0.91 1, 40.28 .345 
Note: CI: confidence interval; df = degrees of freedom; n = number of 
participants 
 
 
